The extent of the Iran threat

Publius makes some points about Iran that I've thought about making and are essentially part of my assumption set when I talk about Iran, but he writes better than I, so here are his:

In other words, the question about what should be done with Iran is essentially a question about what Iran is. For instance, if Iran is in fact a nuclear terrorist threat incapable of being deterred, that calls for a certain type of response. If not, a different response is in order. (For the sake of argument today, let’s assume that threats to allies like Israel should be seen as threats to America.)

The reason then that I recoil from talks of military strikes is that I, perhaps naively, don’t view Iran as a fundamental threat — to the United States or to Israel. It’s true, I don’t see Iran as a Best Friend Forever (and thus I wouldn’t abandon contingency military plans or "trust but verify"), but I don’t see them as an inevitable threat that cannot be stopped, but can only be preempted.

At this point, you may agree or disagree, but the precise question is whether or not this particular perception is accurate. Thus, the first question is not “what should we do?” but “why should I see Iran as an inevitable deadly threat?” You can’t just proceed to justify tactics (like nuclear strikes) that only make sense under a certain assumption.

There are several reasons why I think Iran is not the inevitable enemy they're made out to be. First, and most importantly, Iran craves to be “of this world.” They want to be respected, they want to participate in markets, they want to be rich, etc. Particularly pre-Iraq (and even now, though to a lesser extent), they’ve sent strong signals that they crave a normal relationship with the United States (and with our money).

And it makes sense why they would. The U.S. and Iran — unlike, say, the U.S. and the Islamic Courts in Somalia — have a lot of potential shared interests. They both want stability in the Middle East. They both have a strong interest in stable oil markets. They share a common enemy in Sunni jihadists (that’s a biggie).

In addition, the Iranian public (particularly the massive youth demographic) is the most modern, most stable (i.e., wealth/education distributions), and most pro-Western in the Muslim world. Finally, Iran has substantial (though often overstated) leverage with the Iraqi Shia (more SCIRI/Badr than Sadr/Mahdi). Given our needs in the Middle East and Iran’s desire to be “of this world,” there’s room for a deal here.

In short, we need to opt for a “China strategy” rather than an “Iraq strategy” in dealing with Iran. I’ve explained this before, but the point stands. Economic engagement with China has done more to keep China honest (both economically and militarily) than any military strike could ever have done. I mean, imagine what the world (and the global markets) would like right now if, instead of recognizing China, Nixon had bombed them instead (Ledeen: “Mao is a madman that can’t be reasoned with . . .”).

Fine, you say, but what about their nuclear weapons program? To be clear, I’d much prefer an Iran without nuclear weapons to an Iran with them. But, given the shared interests discussed above, I don’t think it would be the end of Western civilization if they got them. Frankly, the fact that unstable, unreliable Pakistan has nuclear weapons is far more frightening to me (and far more threatening to Israel).