Department of (GOP) Justice

Another story, more or less in the vein of "Theocrats Anonymous" on The Regime's destruction of the infrastructure of our government: today at Law.Com, a Legal Times interview by Tony Mauro of one Daniel J. Metcalfe, former director of the Office of Information and Privacy at the DOJ, entitled "Justice Department's Independence 'Shattered,' Says Former DOJ Attorney" (h/t TPM).

[Quick updates: (1) see a clip from Bill Maher on the DOJ and its sterling cadre of Regent University hires at Crooks & Liars. No real news, but biting. (2) For a more serious posting also dealing with Metcalfe's interview, see Digby.]

I guess the good news from this interview is that the primary problem of Gonzales' tenure at DOJ is not in the destruction of the career staff, but in his gaggle of political appointees: Metcalfe says that he himself served

more than a dozen attorneys general, including Ed Meese as well as John Mitchell, and I used to think that they had politicized the department more than anyone could or should. But nothing compares to the past two years under Alberto Gonzales.

[snip] Under Gonzales, though, almost immediately from the time of his arrival in February 2005, [the pattern of hiring competent aides] changed quite noticeably. First, there was extraordinary turnover in the political ranks, including the majority of even Justice's highest-level appointees. It was reminiscent of the turnover from the second Reagan administration to the first Bush administration in 1989, only more so.

Second, the atmosphere was palpably different, in ways both large and small. One need not have had to be terribly sophisticated to notice that when Deputy Attorney General Jim Comey left the department in August 2005 his departure was quite abrupt, and that his large farewell party was attended by neither Gonzales nor (as best as could be seen) anyone else on the AG's personal staff.

Third, and most significantly for present purposes, there was an almost immediate influx of young political aides beginning in the first half of 2005 (e.g., counsels to the AG, associate deputy attorneys general, deputy associate attorneys general, and deputy assistant attorneys general) whose inexperience in the processes of government was surpassed only by their evident disdain for it.

"Evident disdain": charming. Of course, the fundamentalist theocrats are not the only ones to disdain "the processes of government", now, are they? Fortunately, the political appointees will go at least by 2009, although Metcalfe seems optimistically to hope for a more proximate

Watergate-style repair. By that I mean the appointment of a new attorney general, one who by reputation, background and temperament is well-suited to at least begin the process of restoring the department's previous reputation for political independence and the reliably even-handed administration of justice.

With that, and the necessary "woodshedding" of any future political aides who might be inclined to allow their inexperience to overcome their boss' better judgment, the department's external standing would rise, and in time, its internal morale problems would begin to solve themselves.

It is to be hoped that this will be done on a housecleaning basis, without the appearance (or reality) of a religious witch hunt. Not that claims to martyrdom, religious and/or political (Ollie North, anyone?), will not arise.

Finally, Metcalfe brings this interesting bit of insight into the US Attorney replacement scandal:

The process of agency functioning, however, became dramatically different almost immediately after Gonzales arrived. No longer was emphasis placed on accomplishing something with the highest-quality product in a timely fashion; rather, it became a matter of making sure that a "consensus" was achieved, regardless of how long that might take and with little or no concern that quality would suffer in such a "lowest common denominator" environment. And heaven help anyone, career or noncareer employee, if that "consensus" did not include whatever someone in the White House might think about something, be it large, small or medium-sized.

In short, the culture markedly shifted to one in which avoiding any possibility of disagreement anywhere was the overriding concern, as if "consensus" were an end unto itself.

. . . by operating in this way, they manage to avoid any singular responsibility for the result, or any part of it, which is another way of saying that they see themselves as running no risk of blame if anyone beyond the group has any problem with what they've done at any point.

[snip] You can clearly hear distinct echoes of this ["lowest common denominator" consensus environment] in the recent public statements of Kyle Sampson before the Senate Judiciary Committee. He described what to many listeners was an absolutely astonishing process by which he and a small group of others within the Justice Department handled the matter of U.S. Attorney replacement. By all accounts, no one person was in charge (Kyle described himself as merely the "aggregator"), it operated strictly by "consensus" (a word that he wielded as if it were an indisputably favorable one), and the end result was something that even he could not fully explain.

Yet it became the "groupthink" recommendation to the AG, an unprecedented "hit list" to be endorsed uncritically, as if it were something upon which Gonzales could rely without thinking. (And with nary a paper trail, by the way, which, I can tell you is no small consideration.)

This is not the first time that I thought Gonzales made John Ashcroft look, ugh, good. The whole interview is well worth a read; I have not presented all the juicy bits by any means.