Sectarian violence or insurgents? Part II
In my earlier post today, prompted by a news report of a joint street protest by hundreds of Sunnis and Shiites marching together against American-built walls separating two neighborhoods, I raised the question about how much violence is really “sectarian” violence, and how much is the product a genuine insurgency against collaborators -- against a hated occupying force and its puppet regime? I’ve also asked the following question before. It comes at the same issue from a different angle: if Iraq were going to blow into massive sectarian violence if we leave, why do surveys of Iraqis –- other than Kurds, who seem to really want their own country -- keep saying the very fact of our military occupation is what is raising the violence level; or even saying that security would improve if the occupation ended? If we are really keeping the lid on, don’t you think more than a small minority of Iraqis would want us to stay? It would seem that, if a horrendously violent sectarian civil war were coming, our presence, no matter how distasteful, would be seen as the lesser of two evils.
Everyone keeps ignoring the implications of such responses, but it’s hard not to believe that Iraqis understand their own society a lot more than an American general. Somebody please deal with this. Right now, nobody is, not even the major left-side pundits in the blogosphere. Is it possible that a big proportion of what we call “sectarian” violence is really insurgency violence – i.e., that the victims more often are perceived to be collaborators with a puppet regime than simply members of another sect of Islam? Of course, it all gets complicated, because, as historians tell us, Saddam was Sunni and part of historic Sunni dominance over Shiites. The war changed that, and since the American-created and American-protected government is predominantly Shiite, presumably many Sunnis consider most Shiites to be collaborators with the occupying power. And Shiites seemingly would want to get even for centuries of oppression.
There’s no question, though, that the threat of sectarian violence provides the last remaining shred of justification for Bush, and that in itself raises some skepticism. We’ve been conditioned for many years to think of Iraq in terms of the sectarian divide, and yet there was massive mixing in some parts of the country and some Iraqis have been telling us, without anyone really paying any attention to them, that the West has always exaggerated the enmity between the two sects.
So you wonder how it would work out if, after taking care of getting the people we enticed into going down the garden path out of the danger zone, and possibly making special arrangements for the Kurds in the North that protect them from other Iraqis and protect Turkey from disruption in their ethnically Kurdish border regions, the concept of collaboration with Christian Crusaders from America were taken out of the equation.
Just asking. I don’t see anybody else offering any solutions. Hell, I don’t see anybody else even asking these questions.
Everyone keeps ignoring the implications of such responses, but it’s hard not to believe that Iraqis understand their own society a lot more than an American general. Somebody please deal with this. Right now, nobody is, not even the major left-side pundits in the blogosphere. Is it possible that a big proportion of what we call “sectarian” violence is really insurgency violence – i.e., that the victims more often are perceived to be collaborators with a puppet regime than simply members of another sect of Islam? Of course, it all gets complicated, because, as historians tell us, Saddam was Sunni and part of historic Sunni dominance over Shiites. The war changed that, and since the American-created and American-protected government is predominantly Shiite, presumably many Sunnis consider most Shiites to be collaborators with the occupying power. And Shiites seemingly would want to get even for centuries of oppression.
There’s no question, though, that the threat of sectarian violence provides the last remaining shred of justification for Bush, and that in itself raises some skepticism. We’ve been conditioned for many years to think of Iraq in terms of the sectarian divide, and yet there was massive mixing in some parts of the country and some Iraqis have been telling us, without anyone really paying any attention to them, that the West has always exaggerated the enmity between the two sects.
So you wonder how it would work out if, after taking care of getting the people we enticed into going down the garden path out of the danger zone, and possibly making special arrangements for the Kurds in the North that protect them from other Iraqis and protect Turkey from disruption in their ethnically Kurdish border regions, the concept of collaboration with Christian Crusaders from America were taken out of the equation.
Just asking. I don’t see anybody else offering any solutions. Hell, I don’t see anybody else even asking these questions.
posted by KISSWeb | 3:53 PM
1 Comments:
With the media nodding (or nodding off) to a level of Bush Administation double think unprecedented in American politics, i.e. Iraq wlll implode if we leave so we'll stay and foster the implosion, Democrats are unwilling to cut through the crap, prefering instead to go through the motions of majority mustering so they can say, look we're trying. Give them E for effort.
Post a Comment
<< Home