Repeat the question: why do Iraqis want us out if they will suffer the most?

I have been asking the question for some time, Why do the Iraqis want us out of there if it is all going to descend into a humanitarian disaster? ("">Do Bush and Cheney actually care about "winning" in Iraq?" The Iraqis themselves would have the most to lose, and they should know their own society better than we do, right? It does not make sense.

Yet it does make sense if you consider this: the threat of a human catastrophe plays right into Bush’s hands, allowing for continued and righteous political support from his base supporters, while paralyzing moderates who bought into the “we broke it, we fix it” premise. Edwin Luttwak, a well-known military historian, suggests the answer in an New York Times op-ed that seems to be accessible through the ($) wall. The Shias already have the upper hand by numbers and influence in the Iraqi government we created, and they have militias that apparently serve policing functions within their own geographic sphere. So what we are doing there is fighting the Sunni insurgent forces that, instead of being weakened by us basically as proxies for the Shias, could be functioning as a militia that would police the Sunni Triangle while helping protect Sunnis from Shia violence. As Luttwak notes, the Kurds also have their own militias that are functioning in a police and regional protection capacity.

Fortunately, there is a promising, long-term policy ready and waiting for President Bush whenever he decides to call off the good old college try . . . . American soldiers would no longer patrol towns and villages, conduct cordon-and-search operations, or man outposts and checkpoints. An end to these tasks would allow the greatest part of the troops in Iraq to head home. . . .

The remaining American forces . . . would hole up within safe and mostly remote bases in Iraq — to . . . deter foreign invasion, dissuade visible foreign intrusions, and strike at any large concentration of jihadis should it emerge. This would mean, contrary to most plans . . . that United States military personnel could not remain embedded in . . . the Iraqi Army and police forces. . . .

What would be the result of disengagement along these lines? First, it would not be likely to increase the violence afflicting Iraqi civilians. The total number of American troops in Iraq — even including any surge — is so small, and their linguistic skills so limited, that they have little effect on day-to-day security. . . .

Politically, on the other hand, disengagement should actually reduce the violence. . . . Were the United States to disengage, both Arab Sunnis and Shiites would have to take responsibility for their own security (as the Kurds have doing been all along). Where these three groups are not naturally separated by geography, they would be forced to find ways to stabilize relations with each other. . . .

Could an ethnic/religious standoff might be the avenue for some genuine federation driven by Iraqis and not 25-year-old experts at the American Enterprise Institute? Could it be a worse idea than the one in place now?